L Introduction
Three interim decisions of the Israeli High Court of Justice (the Court) issued during 1996 allowed the continuation of interrogations of suspected terrorists by tbe Israeli General Security Service (GSS), subject to some restrictions.
1 On 9 May 1997, after reviewing a special Israeli report on tbe subject, the Committee against Torture (CAT) decided that the methods mentioned in these cases and additional methods described by non-governmental organizations constituted breaches of Article 16 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and also amounted to torture as defined in Article 1 of that Convention.
2 CAT also criticized the Court for one of tbe above decisions, 3 whose effect, according to CAT, was to allow some of the interrogation practices to continue and to legitimize them for domestic purposes. 4 This comment examines these decisions and assesses the problems and challenges inherent in the domestic regulation of interrogations of suspected terrorists.
EL The Interim Decisions in Context
The three interim decisions can be seen as offsprings of the Report of the Landau Commission of Inquiry into tbe Methods of Investigation of the GSS Regarding Hostile The Hamdan Decision, supra note 1. 4
Supra note 2, section 7.
While it was tecfanicaUy possible for tbe Court to defer judgment on the general questions by not scheduling the hearings, it could not do the same with the detainees' petitions to end their interrogations, during which, they claimed, they.were being tortured. In several cases, the Court issued interim orders precluding the GSS from using force during the interrogations.
14 Tbe orders were issued after the GSS noted that the interrogation had been completed, and that there was no need for further interrogations. No further legal action was taken in those cases after the issuance of these interim orders, and therefore no final judgment was given on the legality of the measures used during those interrogations. These decisions did not clarify the legal status of the interrogation methods, but did at tbe same time relieve the imnwHinti' suffering of the petitioners.
This legal standstill was shaken in 1996. On three occasions, the GSS decided to oppose the Court's issuance of interim orders. 15 Citing pressing operational needs, it requested a judicial 'green light' to continue interrogations. The Court tried to retain ambiguity while granting permission to continue interrogations. Its interim decisions in the first two cases, Bilbeisi 16 and Harridan," allowed the interrogation to continue without any restrictions on the methods used, but reserved judgment on the legality of such methods (under the defence of necessity) to a later stage, when the main arguments would be made. In each case, the Court's decision was based on the fact that the petitioner had confessed to being a terrorist, member of the extreme Islamic Jihad group, and on tbe GSS's substantiated suspicion" that the detainee had extremely vital information which, if procured, could save human lives. The Court cautioned that permission to continue the interrogation did not entail permission to act against the law.
It was only in the third and final case of the 1996 triad, the Mubarak decision, 19 that the Court came as close as condoning a number of methods of interrogation and thereby approving a significant part of the Landau Guidelines. This development took place during a hearing of a detainee's request for a temporary injunction against the continuation of his interrogation, when the GSS insisted not only that the request be refused but also that specific methods be continued. The GSS thus invited the Court to share responsibility for the use of these methods. Thus, for tbe first time, the Court examined specific methods used in GSS interrogations. These methods did not involve the direct infliction of pain. They did, however, subject the detainee to rather harsh conditions in the process of interrogations. As the succinct opinion describes, during a so-called 'waiting period' between interrogations, the detainee is seated on a low chair, his hands handcuffed in a painful position, his head covered with a sack which reaches his shoulders, and loud music is sounded. Consequently, the detainee is unable to sleep in this 'waiting period'. The GSS did not admit that these methods were aimed at breaking the detainee's obdurate wilL It insisted that there was no 'active sleep deprivation', and explained that hooding and loud musk were necessary to prevent communications between the detainees present in the same room, and that the low chair and handcuffs were necessary to prevent them from attacking the interrogators. The waiting period was explained as necessary for security and because of the pressing need to prevent loss of life, when a small number of interrogators must interrogate many rUjninw; at the same time.
The Court did not strictly scrutinize these explanations. Its brief decision accepts the rationale of the 'waiting period', a rationale which renders the variety of other methods almost self-explanatory. 20 One gets the impression that only minimal deprivations, strictly required to facilitate the interrogation, are used. But as revealed in the schedule of the detainee's interrogation, which was attached to the GSS's response, it was the 'waiting period' itself which constituted the arena for weakening the detainee's resolve. 21 This schedule detailed the time spent in the cell, the interrogation room and during the 'waiting period'. The 'waiting period' extended at times to hours, sometimes more than ten hours, and one time more than 26 hours. 'Waiting' would be followed by much shorter periods of interrogations, sometimes even by rest periods in the ceD. 23 The second dimension is institutional, and is concerned with the interrogators' potential abuse of powers by the use of unnecessary force, or again <$ innocent people, and the possible institutional checks against such abuse. The third dimension is legal, and relates to the proper means for implementing the conclusions gleaned from the discussion of the two previous dimensions.
. The Moral Dimension
Any deliberation concerning the moral issue begins or ends with the ticking bomb paradigm, in which a bomb is about to explode causing damage to life and limb, and the only way to find and detonate it is to interrogate the person who set it off or knows how to defuse it This paradigm assumes that using physical or mental pressure during that person's interrogation makes it possible to extract the necessary information. An incident supporting this assumption occurred in October 1994, when an Israeli soldier, Nachsbon Wachsman, was kidnapped by members of Hamas, a militant Palestinian group which attempted to derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through attacks on Israelis, soldiers and civilians «liv* As the deadline for the kidnappers' ultimatum drew near, the Israeli army caught an aide who had provided supplies to the kidnappers. His interrogation provided accurate information as to the house, including its layout, where Wachsman was held. This information was used in planning tbe rescue operation.
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Although details of the interrogation methods were not disclosed, we cannot assume that me aide divulged the information upon his own free will.
The ticking bomb paradigm raises a moral debate concerning the legitimacy of using force to break a detainee's obdurate will in order to obtain life-saving information. One position opposes subjecting detainees to physical or mental suffering in order to make them speak because the detainees are then being used as objects to save others from harm. Sacrificing the well-being of some to protect the well-being of others contradicts the basic concept of human dignity, which precludes a utilitarian calculation of net gain in human lives. 77 With an objective compass to determine who is an illegal target of a ticking bomb situation, it may be possible and legitimate to assign lesser value to the interests of the person responsible for endangering innocent lives. This type of balancing, however, requires attention to the institutional dimension, and particularly to the 'slippery slope' syndrome, issues which are presented below.
IV. The Institutional Dimension
Granted that under extreme conditions, the use of force in interrogations may be morally justified, the argument still remains that such extreme conditions elude legal definition, effective monitoring and enforcement The paradigmatic concern with the slippery slope is that the authority granted to interrogators to identify and react to ticking bomb situations will lead to the excessive use of force in non-extreme circumstances.
31 At the outset it is rather difficult to identify a ticking bomb situation. Usually, the interrogators only have suspicions as to the existence of a bomb, the identity of the detainee, or the usefulness of the detainee's information. The possibility of error cuts both ways. Indeed, in one incident, the GSS claimed that they failed to discern such a situation, consequently did not put sufficient pressure on a detainee and, as a result, could not prevent a deadly explosion in a public bus which -they learned later -had been planned by the detainee. 33 However, there is greater concern that in the continuing battle against terrorism, security forces would tend to regard too many instances as ticking bomb situations and therefore act with unjustifiable violence against detainees. In most cases, the actual occurrence of the ticking bomb paradigm can only be known in retrospect, when it is too late, either for the innocent victims of the terrorist attack or for the innocent detainees.
Note that institutional concerns stem not only from a norm which approves the use of force in ticking bomb situations. An absolute ban on the use of force may also lead to institutional concern: facing what they perceive as a 'real' ticking bomb situation on the one hand, and an absolute prohibition on the use of force on the other, interrogators may be driven to follow their moral judgment, and then deny their unlawful action. When such threats recur, an 'operational code' would soon emerge underneath the myth of legality.
34 Such unregulated code would be more susceptible to the dangers of the slippery slope. Thus an absolute legal ban on the use of force in interrogations could have the opposite effect -unrestrained subversive and brutal activity which is detrimental to detainees and undermines the entire democratic system. Indeed, this concern was the reason for the Landau Commission's decision to pierce the myth of legality and legitimize the operational code of GSS conduct" Therefore, the question is whether legal prescriptions and institutional arrangements can be designed to enable decision-makers, including national courts, to recognize circumstances which justify the use of force in interrogations of suspected terrorists, and at the same time avert the slippery slope syndrome or at least minimize its likelihood to a tolerable level. The following section will analyse this question.
V. Legal and Institutional Responses

A. Two Possible Legal Responses
There are two possible legal responses to this challenge. The first, which I refer to as 'the conceptual approach', is embodied in international instruments and decisions of international institutions. This approach imposes a flat ban on 'torture', 'cruel', 'inhuman' and 'degrading' treatment, and thus provides national courts with the task of giving meaning to these terms. The second approach, which I term the self-defence approach', admits, under exceptional conditions, an exemption from culpability for using violence in interrogations. prohibition of 'torture', 'cruel', 'inhuman' and 'degrading' 'treatment', calls for a conceptual analysis because the prohibition of such acts is not as clear and straightforward as a prohibition on the use of any physical or mental force. Indeed, as I shall argue below, this approach is sensitive to die moral and institutional dimensions discussed above, and takes a position regarding them. It rejects a ban on any forceful measures during interrogations, and invites decision-makers to elaborate on the boundaries separating tolerable and intolerable use of force.
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The implementation of the conceptual approach has led to a discussion regarding two questions. The first and less important one concerns the internal 'hierarchy' of unlawful practices ranging from 'torture' to 'degrading' treatment The second and more important question relates to the distinction between the lesser forms of unlawful violence and die lawful use of force.
By distinguishing between 'torture' and the 'lesser* forms of violence, the texts themselves -and particularly the 1984 Convention against Torture -were interpreted as highlighting different degrees of violence. analysis of unlawful practices, 5 * also struggled with the definition of the threshold of prohibited acts. Deleting its previous reference to 'torture as normally understood', 39 the HRC decided in 1992 to refrain from establishing distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or treatment, emphasizing that the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied'.* 0 Instead of developing a general definition, the HRC resorted to ad hoc findings of violations in specific cases. 61 Therefore, the conceptual approach assigns to decision-makers a relatively wide margin of discretion in analysing whether the ban on torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was indeed violated. 62 An element of subjectivity is unavoidable. As Nigel Rodlcy soberly cautions, in ^WHrting such issues, 'there will inevitably be an element of subjectivity in the willingness of the forum called upon to apply the prohibition to find a violation of it'.
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Can there be better ways of reducing subjectivity in decision-makers' discretion? To examine this question it is necessary to consider the alternative approach, which imposes a flat ban on any use of force, but at the same time recognizes an exception under extreme circumstances.
The Self-Defence Approach
This approach does not necessitate an analysis of what constitutes 'torture' or 'degrading treatment'. Instead, it assumes a ban on any physical or mental coercion during interrogations. However, at the same time, it acknowledges that under extreme conditions, the perpetrator of violence will be exempted from legal sanctions. This is the attitude of many criminal codes, 64 including the Israeli Penal Law. Article 277 of this Law prohibits *public servants' from using or threatening to use force or violence against a person for the purpose of extorting from him or from anyone in whom he is interested a confession of an offence or information relating to an offence. 63 Any use of force would therefore constitute an offence. But at the same time, the Penal Law recognizes a defence called 'private defence', which provides that '[a] person shall bear no criminal liability for an act required to have been done immediately by him to repel an unlawful attack creating an imminent danger of injury to his or another's life, Similar to the conceptual approach discussed above, the self-defence approach also grants discretion to officials to decide whether a certain method of interrogation should be tolerated or condemned. This approach, however, provides a different set of criteria to determine this issue. Instead of a conceptual deliberation on the meaning of 'torture', it focuses directly on questions of necessity, immediacy and proportionalityNote that this approach is strictly limited to self-defence situations. This limitation is manripti'H by a moral analysis of the problem. As concluded earlier, dignity, the defence of necessity does not allow the balancing of one innocent life against other lives.
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An Evaluation of the Two Responses
The two legal approaches outlined above are conceptually different They advance different tests for assessing unlawful conduct The conceptual approach requires an evaluation of the nature, purpose and severity of the conduct, while the self-defence exemption approach emphasizes the necessity, immediacy and proportionality of the conduct But, in fact, the two approaches conceal similar considerations and may have similar outcomes: the nature, purpose and severity of a certain conduct are relevant considerations in assessing the necessity, immediacy and proportionality of that conduct; the necessity, immediacy and proportionality of a conduct may influence the finding whether its nature, purpose and severity constituted torture'. This is not a coincidence: since there are no double moral standards, when a forceful measure is morally justified as legitimate self-defence, such measure cannot be regarded as morally repugnant as torture. And the use of force not in self-defence may very well be deemed torture. Thus, both approaches recognize that sadistic brutality against detainees is illegal. Both approaches would also converge in denouncing certain methods as inherently cruel, methods which will never be considered necessary or proportional. But at the same time, both approaches acknowledge exceptional circumstances in which the use of some coercion during interrogation would be tolerated. Both approaches do not provide clear guidelines as to the definition of these circumstances, and therefore relegate discretion to decision-makers to implement the unclear guidelines to specific cases. Thus, for example, depriving a terrorist of sleep so as to elicit life-saving information may pass the two tests.
Despite these similarities, the two approaches are different in two important ways. First, they are symbolically different The conceptual approach has a clear symbolic advantage: the rhetorical force of an absolute and unqualified ban on 'torture' sends a clear message and sets a universal standard. The finding that 'torture' was committed constitutes a moral condemnation which in the international sphere is a relatively meaningful sanction. The conceptual approach, with its seemingly flat and uncompromising ban, has therefore much more appeal to the international system for protecting human rights.
The second difference between die two approaches lies in their potential influence on national decision-makers. Presumably, the self-defence approach would prove more resistant to the propensity of national decision-makers, including national courts, to adopt subjective views. 73 This assessment relies on die fact that the conceptual approach relates only to torture, whereas the self-defence approach relies on a general and weH-74 See Krcmnitzer, supra note 27, at 248-253; Enker, supra note 68, at 7 l-75;Ttrii is clearly the position of the German law, see Bemsmann, supra note 64, at 180; Fletcher, supra note 64, at 838.
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On this tendency see Rodky, supra note 42.
established doctrine in domestic criminal law. Hence, the domestic jurisprudence on self-defence, developed by courts in the context of numerous criminal cases unrelated to terrorism, might constrain their potential for partiality in torture cases more than the views of international organs. In contrast, a judicial deliberation on the conceptual approach, developed only in tbe context of violent struggle against a real or a perceived enemy, unconstrained by other general doctrines of domestic law, would thus be more susceptible to subjective, even partisan, interpretations. 76 Moreover, a national court might find it more difficult socially and politically to assign to public officials the moral stigma of having committed torture than to find them guilty of using force during interrogation.
This analysis suggests that while the conceptual approach is more appropriate in the international sphere, preference may be accorded to the self-defence exception in the internal sphere. Admittedly, this conclusion advocates incoherence between the international and national spheres. At tbe least, it can be said that such legal incoherence is a fair sacrifice for a national system which promises to be less prone to partiality. But perhaps this very incoherence is beneficial: the inherent friction it creates between the national and the international prisms helps to highlight the fact that there are no easy legal solutions to the moral and institutional questions and provides an opportunity to engage in a heightened dialogue between the national and the international spheres, which is in itself a means to maintain alertness to the need to protect against torture.
B. The Domestic Institutional Response: Judicial Review of Interrogation Methods by National Courts
As was already alluded to in the comparison between the two legal approaches, designing the optimal legal approach cannot be divorced from institutional considerations. While two possible approaches can be designed to appraise interrogation methods, the troubling question is who will do the appraisal and implement the prohibition. National courts hesitate to review their executive branch's opinion on security matters. 77 This reticence only grows when politicians are eager to show resolute efforts to curb terrorism, and when security personnel declare that bombs are about to explode which will kill innocent people and that they know of no better way to stop terrorism.
Despite this inherent institutional deficiency, courts can be, and sometimes are, effective. They can choose to intervene when the constraints within which they operate Abstract review of specific methods has also the benefit of disengagement from actual situations of emergency. Such prospective rulings could guide interrogators and prevent excessive harm to detainees. An example for a petition seeking such ruling is the petition concerning the method of 'shaking', a method proven to carry fatal consequences.* 0 One problem with the prescription, of general rules on interrogation methods, however, is the effect that such prescription may have on interrogators: a prospective approval of a certain method has more potential for misuse by interrogators who know that this method has been sanctioned in principle. Indeed, the Landau Guidelines were criticized inter alia for the effect that their very articulation had of increasing the probability of interrogators' violence." Yet this critique does not apply to a 'reverse-Landau' approach, namely to rulings that define clearly which practices are proscribed under any circumstances, practices which are clearly brutal and can never be justified. The general judicial denouncement of certain methods as absolutely banned will not imply that all other methods are necessarily permitted. Rather, the use of all other methods should be subjected to a strict ad hoc scrutiny (under either the conceptual approach or the self-defence approach, or both).
It is, of course, preferable that courts scrutinize interrogation methods also during an ongoing interrogation. But it is in this situation where judges are less inclined to do so. One can hardly expect judges to interrupt what could later be considered a morally justified action, which could have averted a major disaster. In such circumstances, a judicial decision to defer judgment until the threat is over, given the possibility of effective sanctions against interrogators in retrospect, may be the most one could expect of the courts. It is therefore essential mat when a court issues an interim decision which does not prohibit the continuation of an interrogation, and even the use of certain methods, it clarify that its decision is not final. It should be clear to interrogators that any judicial authorization to act has only a conditional effect, and that impunity is contingent on a thorough retrospective judicial examination, immediately after the crisis is over. The ambiguity introduced by such interim decisions will increase interrogators' uncertainty regarding the adverse consequences of actions which may eventually be deemed unlawful Since these interrogators -including the entire chain of commandare averse to risks of conviction, reprimand or payment of damages, the less clear the exemptions from liability are, the greater the precautions they will take against such risks; they will thus internalize the moral dilemma of the ticking bomb. hi order to ensure this possibility of ex post faction judicial evaluation, it is necessary to supplant the substantive norm with procedural safeguards that enable a thorough factual examination. These safeguards include the keeping of accessible registers with details of the interrogation process, and the right of access to the Court for detainees who complain of mistreatment. The right to claim compensation should be recognized under domestic law and no claim of immunity for the state and its officials should be allowed.*
VL Conclusion
This comment explored two competing approaches to the regulation of interrogations of suspected terrorists, the conceptual approach and the self-defence approach. It suggested that while the first approach better suits international instruments, the second may be employed more effectively by domestic decision-makers. Examining the different opportunities for judicial review of such interrogations, this comment suggested a resolute retrospective review is the least-worse available domestic guarantee against harsh treatment of detainees which does not amount to clear examples of torture. While a general prohibition is called for with respect to particularly brutal methods, methods so harsh that no exceptional circumstances could condone, deferring judgment will be 82 See the HRC General Comment no. 20, jupra note 41, Article 14.
appropriate when lesser methods are used and the moral issue is difficult to resolve without the benefit of hindsight Security personnel must thus be exposed to the additional burden of criminal or civil liability, or disciplinary measures, should a court later find them responsible for torturing or inhumanely or degradingh/ treating a detainee. This additional burden decreases the exposure of detainees to harsh measures because it prompts interrogators to internalize the moral dilemma introduced by the ticking bomb paradigm. Judgment, however, should not be postponed for an indefinite period. Strict scrutiny of aD circumstances must immediately follow after the emergency situation has subsided Procedural guarantees must be kept in order to provide effective review.
These conclusions only partly support the jurisprudence of the Israeli Court while the policy of avoiding 'real time' 1 determinations is understandable under a real or perceived emergency situation, the Court should expedite its retrospective review, examining each case in an uncompromising manner. Similar scrutiny may also be provided by a court entertaining post faction civil or criminal proceedings against the interrogators. The Court is yet to prove that it is willing to complement its policy of avoiding 'real time' judgments with a strong retrospective review of interrogation methods. Although it once sent brutal interrogators to prison, its indefinite deferral of certain petitions concerning the legality of GSS action, and its casual treatment of the 'waiting period' concept, cast doubt on its determination to scrutinize interrogators' practice strictly. Civil suits seeking pecuniary compensation for damage inflicted during GSS interrogations are still pending before lower courts. Hopefully, the Court will fully use these additional avenues for judicial review to provide an effective remedy for unnecessary violations of human dignity in interrogations. In this sense it is necessary to emphasize that the three 1996 decisions discussed in this comment were only interim decisions. The Court still faces the more crucial challenge of a thorough retrospective review.
